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Abstract
Sikorsky Aircraft Co. currently finds itself in a critical growth period, in terms of both
sales contracts and supplier agreements. Popular supply chain strategies preach reduction and
simplification of the supply base, but Sikorsky encounters "must-grow" situations with their
supply base, due to factors like international offset provisions and capacity needs. Growth in the
number of supplier relationships each year strains the supply management department and makes
it difficult to complete full analyses of new suppliers. The goal of this research is to provide tools
that combine the knowledge of experienced supply chain employees with statistical analysis in a
package that will allow any member of the supply chain group to complete a thorough supplier
risk analysis in the minimum amount of time.
To address Sikorsky's supply chain risk, a concrete framework is desired that will ask the
right questions about a supplier and produce an indicator of the level of risk involved in a
supplier agreement. This project sets out to identify the connections between the sources of risk
(risk drivers) and affected performance metrics (effects). These connections can be presented in
an easy-to-use tool that enables quick yet thorough analyses. The framework links supplier
analyses with the resulting performance, and uses the results to make data driven inferences
about future supplier relationships. This allows quick and informed assessments by anyone in the
supply chain group, regardless of their level of experience.
The result of this project is a software-based risk assessment framework with scoring
based on historical Sikorsky supplier performance. The data have revealed through statistical
regression analysis strong correlations between a number of risk drivers and resulting supplier
performance. These correlations can be used to score suppliers with similar attributes through the
model. In addition, the model can be used as a knowledge retention mechanism of supplier
performance data to facilitate future refinements of both the model and risk driver/effect
correlations.
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Title: Associate Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
Thesis Advisor: Roy Welsch
Title: Professor of Statistics and Management Science
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Chapter 1: Project Overview
The words "outsourcing" and "globalization" are as popular in business circles as they've
ever been, and companies like Sikorsky are starting to feel the effect of getting farther and
farther from their sources of supply. As economies grow and emerging markets enter the global
marketplace, Sikorsky is finding larger and larger audiences to sell goods and services beyond
their native region, country, and even continent. Sikorsky must now decide how much of this
new business they want to pursue and consequently how many suppliers should be added to
enable sales to these new markets. When new markets are pursued, should they try to keep their
list of suppliers short, or expand the supply base into developing countries where costs may be
lower, but risks may also be higher? Despite observed industry trends of supply base reduction
(Goffin, Szwejczewski and New, 1997), arguments can also be made for supply chain
redundancy to mitigate the effects of supply disruptions, for instance (Sheffi, 2001). Generally,
"it can be seen that, whilst there is general agreement on the reduction of multi-sourcing
networks, there is a range of views on the relative merits of single and multi-sourcing." (Harland,
1996) The advantages of each view have been summarized in Table 1. Sikorsky, however, must
partially ignore many of these arguments as they are now faced with situations where their
business specifically requires growth in the supply chain. One example of this forced growth is
with international offset arrangements, where "Countries are requiring more technology transfer,
higher offset percentages, and higher local content requirements to offset their foreign military
purchases (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996)." The "local content requirements" cited
above are the source of this supplier growth. This demands a larger focus on the issue of risk in
the supply chain and selecting the "right" suppliers.
Advantages of Broad
Networks
Adaptable to Change
More switching
opportunities
Wider access to
knowledge
Hedge against uncertainty
Cost competitive
Table 1 - Relative merits of broad versus
Advantages of Narrow
Networks
Collaborative Innovation
Rigid and Strong
Dense flows of
information
Higher confidentiality
Shared Destiny
narrow supplier networks (Harland, 1996)
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Like forecasting, risk assessments are never an exact science and can never predict the
future. However, they can be used as learning tools. If created correctly, they can help see past
biases and broken mental models to reveal risks that have been right under the noses of everyone
involved. Such tools aim to work by stimulating thought and research, not by predicting what
will happen. It is in these respects that this research attempts to ask objective questions and
provide objective answers to help start the process of managing the risk in a supply chain.
This chapter has been decomposed into several sections providing an overview of the
research process. It starts with a brief problem statement to set the tone of the following work
and provide further context into the motivation behind the work. Background information about
Sikorsky and Sikorsky's parent company, United Technologies Corporation follows the problem
statement. The discussion then moves on to a description of the group, supply management,
where the research project work was conducted and a description of the problem to be addressed.
The overview wraps up with a discussion of the project deliverables and methods used to create
the deliverables. In-depth analyses of the methods used are provided in subsequent chapters.
Problem Statement
There are inherent risks in evaluating a contract with an international supplier/partner.
These risks can be broken into the categories of scheduling, technology, and cost uncertainty
(Sinha, Whitman, and Malzahn, 2004):
0 Schedule risk is the probability that the supplier will not deliver on time
0 Technology risk is the probability that the supplied goods or services do not meet
the performance and quality standards as specified
0 Cost risk is the probability that the goods or services will not be delivered at the
price that was agreed upon when the order was placed
As a company's supply base grows to support new sales contracts, the management and
assessment of those risks becomes increasingly complicated. A concrete framework is desired
for quantifying and speeding up the assessment of the risks associated with such an endeavor.
This project sets out to identify and quantify the risks involved to hopefully distill out a
numerical score and a course of action that can be used to evaluate a supplier. "The purpose of
risk analysis is to develop a structured way of defining, identifying, assessing, and mitigating the
risks." (Sinha et al, 2004). In this research, the focus will be on identifying and assessing risk.
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As discussed above, Sikorsky Aircraft finds itself in a time of significant growth in the
supply chain. In many cases, proliferation of the number of suppliers in a company's supply base
is something that would be controlled and limited. However, in this situation, Sikorsky is
required to add suppliers to fulfill offset, small disadvantaged business, and other related
mandates that have been put in place. Therefore, they require a tool that will consolidate all of
the risk management resources at their disposal and provide easy methods for monitoring and
assessing the risk in the escalating number of supplier contracts.
At Sikorsky there are numerous methodologies that have been developed in house or
acquired externally to monitor different aspects of a supplier relationship. In the case of
Sikorsky, specifically, there is a separate tool for the quality group to record the quality record of
a supplier, a separate tool for the supply chain group to monitor the delivery performance of a
supplier, a separate third-party software program for supply chain employees to monitor other
aspects of a supplier relationship, etc. These tools all contain data that is useful in monitoring the
performance of a supplier, but they are all used individually by their own groups. It would be
useful for the supply chain group to look at every source of data together when evaluating a
supplier. In addition, very few of these methods are useful when used by themselves to evaluate
a new supplier. It is only through the integration of these tools that a true evaluation can be
conducted. It is apparent that if there was one place where all of this data was gathered for
evaluating a supplier it would speed the process and help to avoid the "silo"-ing affect that
occurs (where all data is kept in its own silo). Supplier decisions could be made based not just on
the data that matters to purchasing (on time delivery), but also by integrating metrics that serve
other parts of the organization (quality, customer service).
Corporation Background
To provide context for the issues and challenges inherent in this project, a brief overview
of Sikorsky aircraft's and United Technologies Corporations' history and corporate culture are
appropriate. These reviews will cover the past and present states of these business entities and
hopefully paint a more complete picture of the competitive landscape that Sikorsky is
participating in.
11
United Technologies Corporation
In its current state, United Technologies Corporation is a major multinational corporation
with business units in the aerospace, heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), Fuel
Cells, Fire Suppression, Security, elevators, escalators and other related technologies that earned
$47.8 billion in 2006 revenues with rankings that include the 20th largest U.S. manufacturer
(2006 list, Industry Week), 43rd largest U.S. corporation (2006 list, Fortune), and 126th largest
corporation in the world (2006 Global 500 List, Fortune)'. The beginnings of United
Technologies are complicated, but the first of the current United Technologies business units to
be created was the Otis Corporation under Elisha Graves Otis, who demonstrated his invention
of an elevator with a safety mechanism to prevent falling at the New York World's fair in 1853.
However, Otis was not acquired by United Technologies until 1976. The United Technologies
Corporation actually evolved from United Aircraft, which was created in 1934 when United
Aircraft and Transport was dissolved. United Aircraft and Transport Corporation was considered
anti-competitive by the U.S. government, due to newly passed antitrust laws that forbade
airframe or engine manufacturers from having interests in airlines. At this time United Aircraft
and Transport Corporation included Boeing Airplane Company, Hamilton Aero Manufacturing,
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company, Sikorsky Aviation Corporation (now Sikorsky Aircraft) as
well as United Airlines2 . After the dissolution, United Aircraft Corporation was established
consisting of Pratt & Whitney, Sikorsky, Hamilton Standard (now part of Hamilton Sundstrand),
which are all current business units of United Technologies Corporation. Since that time, United
Technologies has grown considerably and acquired multiple companies. United Technologies
Corporation now boasts over 215,000 employees in over 4,000 locations, in approximately 62
countries. The full list of current business units is:3
Carrier heating and air conditioning systems
Hamilton Sundstrand aerospace and industrial systems
Otis elevators and escalators
Pratt & Whitney aircraft engines
Sikorsky helicopters
'http://wwwutc.com/profile/facts/indcex.hti (March 30, 2007)
2 http/www t tcom/profile/facts/history.htm (September 11, 2006)
3 http://www.utc.corm/profile/facts/index.htrr (March 30, 2007)
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UTC Fire & Security protection services
UTC Power
United Technologies Research Center
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
Started in 1923, the Sikorsky Aero Engineering Corporation (changing its name a number
of times until settling on The Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation) is the result of nearly a lifetime of
aerospace research and development by Igor Sikorsky. Born in Kiev on May 25, 1889,
Sikorsky's early captivation with the works of Leonardo DaVinci and stories of Jules Verne led
him to build a rubber band powered model helicopter at the age of 12. After engineering study
and experiments in a German hotel room on a 4 foot diameter helicopter rotor, Igor Sikorsky
built a coaxial twin-bladed rotor helicopter in 1909. This helicopter never actually flew, as
engineering calculations revealed that the aircraft only produced 357 pounds of lift, 100 pounds
less than the weight of the aircraft.
At this point Sikorsky turned his attention to fixed wing aircraft and after brief stints as
an aircraft engineer in Russia and France, he arrived in New York on March 3 0 th, 1919. It wasn't
until 1923 that Sikorsky was able to begin working on aircraft again, when he raised funds for an
all-metal, twin-engine passenger plane. The Sikorsky Aero Engineering Corporation was formed
on a farm in Long Island. Igor Sikorsky went on to create several notable aircraft, including the
eight-seat S-36 which entered service with Pan-American Airways in 1928 and the nine-
passenger S-38 which drew orders from 10 airlines. The continued success with passenger
aircraft led to the acquisition of Sikorsky Aviation Corporation as a subsidiary of the United
Aircraft Corporation in 1929.
Igor Sikorsky finally had sufficient support to resume work on helicopters and did so in
1931 when he patented the current most common configuration: 1 main rotor and 1 tail rotor to
offset the torque caused by the main rotor. The open cockpit VS-300 helicopter flew for the first
time in 1939. The progress from there was rapid and in WWII, cloth covered Sikorsky
helicopters were flying combat rescue and Medevac missions4.
4 hlttp://www.silkorsky.com/details/0,9602,CLI] DIV69 ET1683,00.htmI (September 11, 2006)
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Now, Sikorsky helicopters are operated by all five branches of the United States Armed
forces as well as operators in 40 countries around the world. Boasting revenues of $2.8 Billion in
20055, Sikorsky is the company behind the workhorse UH-60 Blackhawk line of helicopters and
the successful S-92 commercial helicopter. By the end of 2006, Sikorsky helicopter hoped to fly
a demonstration of their revolutionary X-2 helicopter technology, which will utilize two counter-
rotating rotors on the same axis and auxiliary propulsion to cruise at 250 knots.
International Supply Management
Background
Internal growth
Stritegic Mergers and acquisitions
Relationshipi Asset S n rin Exit an nustry. segent.Integration) joint etlre ora ou
RDaomtion u McrktrrVEqurty 52 int prodtisun a Diatribain an oiesloint venture
Striategic If 0 Minorty equity ownerh ip
Stritegi * To hno y systermo ur tion a Technology developmentiritegreto uVlue-dri reng
Strategic / UDOibtion and sales a Sharedoresourcing le 0 e ok*dvlpnn Ex olume straie9 sigrnls
Customer *Emn e and qneci products
alliances A r c* and s upp catoo el pom
Collab ative pod&inn gandjoibiddinrelationahip sCopronV andnjoint 0508 R&D
Tactical yand oint dloselopment agreementTransi tol
E ss4t Preferred OEM suppliersExchange) ///
t Vendors and commodity suppliers
Exclusivity. Trust. Control. Risk, and Reward
Figure 1 - Strategic outsourcing relationship continuum (Blumberg & Miller, 2002)
The international supply management group in Sikorsky Aircraft is responsible for
initiating and managing outsourcing agreements ranging from simple vendor relationships to
strategic integration. These arrangements can be displayed along an outsourcing relationship
continuum as displayed in Figure 1 (Blumberg & Miller, 2002). Though each of these
agreements requires a different level of cooperation by each party, all are handled within the
same group within Sikorsky. The group is managed by three individuals and supported by
buyers, who handle both international and domestic contracts. The buyers generally do not get
involved until a supplier has signed on to supply parts and/or services, so it is essentially the job
5 UTC 2005 Annual Report
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of three people to initiate contact and manage the contracting process for every international
supplier. Only after a company goes through the process of being evaluated and eventually
becoming a supplier, they are eventually assigned to a buyer for general contact.
Issues and Concerns
As mentioned, the number of suppliers is growing rapidly each year, where a large
portion (greater than one third) is international suppliers. This growth puts an enormous strain on
the international supply management group, and hinders their ability to spend sufficient time
evaluating each new supplier. There are two key drivers behind this massive growth in recent
years: growth in number of projects and international offset provisions.
Though Sikorsky has not seen a large proliferation in the number of helicopter models
they manufacture, the number of configurations that are provided to various countries has grown
considerably. This pushes the capacity of Sikorsky's manufacturing operations to the limit and
has increased the percentage of the aircraft considered for outsourcing. As mentioned earlier,
higher levels of cooperation are used in recent co-production agreements as well. Outsourcing
and co-production of aircraft parts will sometimes go to a current supplier, but in most cases a
new supplier must be signed. As the United States is considered a high-cost nation in terms of
fabrication and assembly, Sikorsky has sought out increasing numbers of international suppliers
to control costs as much as possible. A table of manufacturing labor wages is provided as Table
6
2 .
Country Labor Cost ($[hour)
Germany $21.68
Spain $16.73
United States $15.31
Israel $12.99
Japan $10.36
Singapore $9.20
Taiwan $5.11
Hungary $3.82
Poland $3.56
Czech Republic $2.95
Romania $1.74
Table 2- International Manufacturing Wages6
6 International Labour Organization Data (http://laborsta lo.orc/) Table 5B, Economic Activity 35, year 2004
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Besides seeking cheaper labor and added capacity, the growth of global sales has also
created a push for more international suppliers, due to international offset provisions. These
offset provisions are often required by foreign governments and stipulate that if Sikorsky wishes
to sell aircraft to a foreign nation, a portion of the aircraft must be manufactured in that nation,
purchased in that nation, or some amount of work provided in that nation. This complicates the
sales effort within Sikorsky as sales to a new nation may create the need in supply management
to bring in new supply agreements. Thus the recent growth within Sikorsky of foreign sales
contracts has created a wave of suppliers that must be in specific foreign nations.
Handling this growth has created a strain in the international supply chain department.
Therefore, the department has the need for a tool or methodology that can quickly and efficiently
do a baseline analysis of potential risks in a supplier relationship without taking up too much of
the time of the management and buyers of the group. Though this research was conducted based
on the challenges of the international procurement group, the results will be applicable to the
supply chain group as a whole.
Deliverables
There are three major deliverables for this research project: an initial framework for
supplier risk assessment, a framework improvement method, and a rollout plan. All of these
deliverables are focused on the framework itself, but they bear individual mention due to the fact
that the framework itself will only provide assessment for a short period of time. It is the
standardization of the assessment as well as the ability to augment the framework over time that
will allow the supplier evaluation framework to become and remain a viable tool.
Risk Assessment Framework
The framework has been constructed such that a number of questions about the supplier,
the contract, and global metrics (i.e. labor rates, exchange rates) will reveal areas of risk
regarding a supplier relationship. These questions have been finely tuned to be both easy to
answer at the time of supplier assessment, yet provide insight into features of a company that
have proven risky. The overall goal within the framework was to provide a platform that would
be familiar to all users, yet contain the logic necessary to infer the effects of the characteristics in
a supplier agreement.
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Microsoft Excel was chosen as the environment the tool would reside in for a number of
reasons. The first of these is that it is a known platform that everyone in the Supply Management
department of Sikorsky already knows how to use and does use on a daily basis. This will make
it possible for use and modification to be accomplished by anyone in the group, not just a select
few. Beyond the fact that everyone in the group has a high level of competence with the tool is
the simple fact that everyone already has the software installed on their desktop PC. This avoids
a number of support issues as well as IT issues with gaining permission to install new software.
Framework Improvement Methods
The framework provides a starting point, but will not provide accurate assessment
forever. To ensure that the risk scores computed by the framework are accurate over time, it must
be updated regularly to take into account new trends and experiences with Sikorsky suppliers. To
accomplish this, instructions have been provided to allow Sikorsky to make these updates as
effortlessly as possible. These instructions include technical guidance on how to physically
update the spreadsheet and roll out the changes as well as practices for use in the company to
both improve the effectiveness of the model as well as facilitate easy updates in the future.
The technical instructions mentioned focus mainly on types of locations on servers where
the framework should reside, the commands to use to update the format of the framework, the
tools to use to update the scoring of the framework, and others. Though the environment is
familiar to everyone using the tools, the concepts and structures used in the framework may not
be. Therefore, the technical instructions are clear and concise to enable regular updating of the
model.
Beyond the technical instructions, recommended practices are provided to improve the
effectiveness of the model. In many cases these practices focus on increasing the volume of data
passing through the model. This includes gaining wider use, saving data for a longer time
horizon, and practices for adding questions over time as new trends arise.
Rollout Plan
As with most standard practices, a well designed rollout plan is necessary to ensure that
the framework gets the correct audience and is correctly used. Far too many implementations of
tools fall by the wayside because they do not clearly present a case for addressing the issues
facing the users or they are not properly supported. The rollout plan created for this project
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focuses on empowering the main users of the tool and streamlining their supplier analysis. In
addition the rollout plan will mandate support mechanisms to ensure those with problems don't
have to wait long for help; the longer a user has to wait for help, the more likely they are to lose
faith in the tool and drop it.
Methodology
The methodology followed here involved four major steps: developing a risk list, creating
a framework, scoring the framework, generating standard work and procedures.
Risk List
Before any framework could be created, an in-depth analysis of the risks facing the
supply management group at Sikorsky was necessary. For the purposes of this exercise, a risk
was defined as the risk of poor performance from a supplier. First, interviews with members of
the supply management group were conducted to assess which risks were apparent to members
of the groups. In addition to a discussion of the effects of risk in a supplier relationship, factors
that may contribute to a performance risk (risk drivers) were listed as well. Once this first-pass
list was created, it was reviewed and appended with factors from case studies of real Sikorsky
experiences as well as research in scholarly journals. The processes followed, as well as the risk
effects to focus on are based on work by Sinha et al. (2004). The risk effects are based on those
presented as "scheduling, technological, and cost uncertainty" in their work, but will be called
more specifically in this research delivery, quality, and cost, respectively. In addition, the risk list
generation follows the Sinha et al. (2004) Activities 1-3 of Brainstorming, Identifying Risks, and
Classify Risks. These activities were repeated in an iterative fashion until further iterations
yielded no additions, at which point a final listing of risk drivers was created. The resulting
drivers were divided into four major categories: Financial Factors, Design Factors, Operations
Factors, and Business Factors.
Framework Creation
After the final list of risks was created, the focus turned to developing a framework that
provided a path for identifying and assessing these risks effects and drivers for a specific supplier
and contract. The requirements were that the framework be quick, concise, easy to use, and able
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to provide clear results. Based on these requirements, a platform would first need to be selected,
then the format of the framework, and finally the way in which results would be conveyed.
In selecting the platform, a computer based approach was selected immediately for
numerous reasons, not the least of which being the easier retention and modification of electronic
data. Immediately the platform options were limited by common IT practices as well as
employee daily usage. Many IT managers keep tight control over which software can and can not
be installed on user computers. Therefore, software that users already had on their PCs would be
highly advantageous. In addition, the users in the group used very few computer tools on a day-
to-day basis. These included SAP ERP software, Microsoft Office products, and web based
tools. Therefore, the decision was made to focus the platform on one of these three tools. Of
these three tools, Microsoft Office Excel was selected as the platform, due to the ease of use,
familiarity of the employees, easy modification, and low effort required in programming
interfaces. The closed nature of the SAP and web based approaches, would be more mistake
proof and avoid modification errors, but both approaches stifle the ability to change framework
structure quickly and easily by anyone in the group and would have required more programming
effort. The Microsoft Excel approach provides quick turnaround for changes, ease of use
between users, and an easily expandable system with little IT effort.
With a platform selected, the next area of focus rested on the format. Once again, the
format needed to be easy-to-use, quick, concise and able to provide clear results. The very
common questionnaire format can accommodate all of these features and also provides a format
that most users are familiar and comfortable with. A simple data entry screen may have been
sufficient, but some of the metrics used in the analysis may be interpreted differently for
different suppliers and contracts. Therefore, a questionnaire gives the author more freedom to
define the questions and expected responses.
The process for the next step of formulating the questions for the questionnaire was very
similar to the way in which the risk list was created. First, in a brainstorming session, one or
more questions were created for each risk driver. Each question was selected such that it would
provide as accurate a measure of how each risk driver applies to the supplier contract as possible.
After this initial list, an iterative process that included interviews, pilot studies and more
brainstorming was used to refine the questions. The goals of the refinements were that the
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number of questions was minimal, the data needed for the question is readily available to the
user, and the result directly applies to a risk driver.
Once the question list was created, a link between the questions and expected
performance was necessary. A statistical regression model was identified as a suitable method
for identifying these links. Statistical regression models are a widely used and studied approach
and thus serve as a standard for analyzing the effects of the process to some stimulus. A similar
approach was used by Tan, Kannan, Handfield, and Ghosh (1999), where a regression model was
used to determine the effect of supply chain management techniques on overall company
performance. In our system, however, the effect is poor supplier performance in the areas of cost,
quality and delivery, while the stimuli are characteristics of the supplier, contract, and global
economy. To use a regression, a large amount of representative data was needed. Once this data
was obtained statistical modeling tools could be used to analyze the links between the effects to
the stimuli. In the case of this project, a sampling of current and past Sikorsky suppliers was
collected. The questionnaire was then filled out for each of these suppliers as if they were being
assessed at the beginning of their contract. Then, the resulting performance metrics of that
supplier were gathered for the length of the contract. This data coupled with the statistical
modeling tools provided weighting for the questions that revealed a correlation. These weights
were then used in the framework to provide a scoring based on the answers to the questions.
Once the correlations were identified and the framework was able to score the factors that
posed the greatest risk, these risk scores needed to be displayed in the most usable way possible.
The decision was made to present the score using a single value between 1 and 10 for each major
risk driver category described above, and one overall value between 1 and 10. Narrowing the risk
"score" down to single value removes a fair amount of resolution from the result, but that is by
design. Overall, this approach is not meant to predict the future of a supplier relationship; it is
only meant to provide a "red flag" of whether there are areas of concern. That is the intent of this
single value.
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Chapter 2: Risk Evaluation Framework Details
The risk evaluation framework is meant to address the supplier evaluation needs of the
international supply management department and beyond. While remaining within the
parameters of being concise, quick, easy and accurate for supplier evaluation, the goals of the
framework include having an impact beyond the supply management department. An overview
of the framework was provided in previous sections. This section focuses on the detailed work
performed and the results obtained. The discussion begins with a brief section to reemphasize the
goals of the framework. The following sections provide a list and descriptions of the tools
integrated into the analysis, details about the structure of the framework, in-depth analyses of the
risk factors included. The section then closes with the development and results of the scoring
mechanism.
Framework Goals
First and foremost, the framework addresses the needs of the international supply
management group mentioned above. Constructed of a questionnaire of finely tuned questions,
the framework attempts to cut through useless questions and focus on those that are both
insightful into the expected performance of a supplier relationship and based on data that is
easily available by buyers and managers within the supply management group at the time of
supplier evaluation. In this way, the framework will act as a litmus test of a supplier where areas
of concern will be quickly highlighted.
The goals beyond assessment lie in utilizing new data sources and providing a data
retention tool for continued supplier analysis. The first of these secondary goals is a response to
the fact that supply management uses only its own data sources, both electronic and non-
electronic, when evaluating suppliers. Various other groups in Sikorsky have useful metrics and
data that can be used to augment the analyses done within supply management. These sources,
however, are not used regularly. In addition to other internal data sources, the framework reaches
outside to a web based supply chain risk database. The supply management group does currently
subscribe to this database, but actual use is rare. In this context, the goal is to apply other data
sources to a supplier analysis and convert them into a number with a specific meaning to a
supply management employee. A fitting example exists in the online supply chain database. It
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contains metrics for hundreds of thousands of companies with values that range from 1 (low risk)
to 5 (high risk) for various aspects of performance. These numbers, however, have no specific
meaning to someone in Sikorsky's supply management group (i.e. "What's the difference
between a 2 and a 3 for on-time delivery?"). The framework will take these values and tie them
to the performance of actual Sikorsky suppliers. Therefore, each value will be tied with a point of
reference that is familiar in Sikorsky's context, like a previous supplier.
The next of these secondary goals is to have a platform for the retention of important
supply chain data. This goal came to light as a result of the challenges encountered in data
gathering for the initial framework scoring. When doing a retrospective analysis of a sampling of
companies, much of the data that would easily be accessible at the time of analysis has been lost
since that time. If this framework gains continued use and is stored, it can serve as the data
source for future refinements of the model. It will also serve as a source of aggregated data. In
looking at past analyses, a supply management employee will no longer have to gather data from
separate resources. Rather, the data will be stored in one place, the framework.
Tools integrated into the analysis
As mentioned, a number of diverse data sources are included in the framework analysis.
Below is a listing of these sources:
Online Database: An online supply chain risk database, whose real name has been
concealed, supplies some of the answers to the questions in the framework. The reason this data
source was included in the framework is explained briefly in the previous section; its values have
little context for the average viewer, but the values are the result of real-world supplier
performance. In the framework, the actual meaning on the performance values can be related to
performance that has true meaning in Sikorsky's context. This database also has limited
information about defect rates and delivery metrics for many of the suppliers. It also contains
Lean Assessments that can be forwarded to suppliers and tracked on the site. The framework will
use specific data from these sources when available.
Warning Signals: Warning signals is Sikorsky's internal supplier quality recording
database. This data is gathered from Sikorsky assessments of delivered product from their
suppliers. When reviewing a possible new contract for a past supplier of Sikorsky's, this data
will prove useful in the analysis and offer data from the perspective of the quality group.
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Supplier Delivery System: The supplier delivery system is yet another data source in
Sikorsky that tracks and easily displays supplier delivery metrics. As with Warning Signals, this
data source is useful in performing an analysis of current and past suppliers of Sikorsky.
Various Audits: Standard audits are performed by the supply management department
for the government and other agencies. These audits cover topics such as capacity, cost, and
licensing. Data from these audits also provide insights into the details of supplier contracts.
Free Online Resources: General trends and economic data easily obtainable on the web
were included as well. Examples from this source are financial reports, exchange rates, and labor
rates.
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Figure 2 - Framework View
A compressed view of the risk framework is illustrated in Figure 2. In use, the four
colored sections do not overlap, but rather lie one after another in the excel sheet. Each main risk
group is highlighted with a different color; financial risks are green, design risks are blue,
operations risks are yellow, and business risks are in red.
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Figure 3 - Financial Group Closeup
Within each main risk group, the analysis is broken down further into key risk drivers
within that category. These key risk drivers are indicated in bold text in the left pane of each risk
group. An example can be seen in Figure 3, where "Proposed Price" is a key risk driver. Next to
each key risk driver is a short description of what behaviors are covered by that risk. After the
short description is a breakdown of the score for that key risk, in the form of three numbers
highlighted in grey. The first number is the total weight associated with that key risk driver. The
second and third numbers are the score for expected late delivery risk and expected quality
defect risk, respectively. Listed below each bolded key risk driver are a number of questions that
are used to generate the score. Each question is numbered and has a white area that serves as the
response input. Responses take the form of drop-down selections and numerical inputs. Just like
the key risk driver, each question has a score breakdown of weight and individual scores for late
delivery risk and quality risk. The scores for each question are weighted and combined to form
the associated key risk driver score. For example, in Figure 3 the scores for questions 10 through
14 fourteen are used to compute the score for "Proposed Price". Also, in the far left column are a
number of "help" buttons. For a number of questions, help is provided by clicking the button
next to the question. Help includes links to relevant data sources, equations, and instructions for
formulating the answer to the question. Finally, at the bottom right of each main risk group is a
single score for that group that is computed using the key risk drivers for that group. This score
is color coded so that values below 5 are green (low risk), between 5 and 8 are yellow (medium
risk), and above 8 are red (high risk).
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Result Time Weighted Result
4.27.4..4.......
Hstoy
Date Time Weighted Score Current Result Financial Design Operations Business
9/2612006 4.54 4 54 6 15 2 32 4 41 5 26 - After Last Update Clear history
GiM2G2006 4 54 4 54 6 15 2 32 4 41 5 26 .-.... J
912612005 4 54 4 54 6 16 2 32 441 5 269/26/2004 4 54 4 54 6 15 2 32 4 41 5 26
9262003 4 54 4 54 6 15 2 32 4 41 5 26
9/262002 345 3 45 5 66 2 14 3 89 2 11
Figure 4 - Results Section
After the four main groups, there is a results section, as seen in Figure 4. This section
facilitates continuous monitoring of a supplier. It includes the total result for the current
responses, a time weighted result, and finally a history section of past scores. The time-weighted
score is computed based on the current score, the previous time weighted score, and the amount
of time since the last update. The effect is that short "spikes" in the results will be smoothed and
longer trends can be watched. For instance, if the last time the score was updated was a year ago,
the time weighted score will be almost identical to the current score (no smoothing will occur).
However, if the model had been updated yesterday, the time weighted result will be more highly
weighted to the previous time weighted score. Below these two scores, is a history of what the
main group values were each time the time weighted score was updated.
Key Risk Areas
The lynchpin of creating an effective risk assessment is being able to generate a complete
list of the possible risk areas. To facilitate this process, personal experience, past Sikorsky
experience, and industry standard risk factors were gathered to construct as thorough a list as
possible, without making the framework unwieldy. All risks were evaluated based on their effect
on multiple supplier performance metrics.
The risks were divided into four main categories: Financial Risks, Design Risks,
Operations Risks, and Business Risks. The Financial Risks all deal with the financial state and
economic inputs of the supplier. These factors will mainly affect the price of the delivered
product, but in some cases can actually cause a breach of contract (like the partner going out of
business). Design Risks address the robustness of the design work completed at Sikorsky, if
Sikorsky is the designer of the part. These factors address effect of design stability on final
delivery as well as potential delays and cost overruns that may occur due to immature,
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inefficient, or incorrect designs. Operations Risks capture all of the risks inherent in the actual
manufacturing work performed by the supplier for the agreement in question. It not only captures
the partner's ability to deliver product on schedule, but also addresses whether the supplier has
the capacity and ability to meet the demand of materials it has promised to manufacture itself.
Finally, Business Risks address the general risks due in the business climate that could cause
variability in the entire project. Covered in these risks are political, social, and licensing risks.
These risks threaten to affect the supplier's entire business rather than this specific project.
However, the effect on the business has the high likelihood of trickling down into the agreement
Sikorsky has with the supplier.
Financial Risks
The goal for the financial risks is to capture not only the financial standing of the supplier
but also the global conditions necessary to draw conclusions about their ability to deliver at the
proposed price. Company financial reports as well as global factors like exchange rates will be
considered to formulate a score for the financial viability of a contract in a specific supplier's
hands. In addition, these partners may be very aggressive in their proposed costs. It will be
necessary to analyze and compare these estimates to historical or competitive estimates to
determine if they are realizable. Risk drivers in this area are:
o Supplier Financial Standing
" Financial Ratios
" Debt Ratings
" Payables
o Exchange Rates
o Labor Rates
o Proposed Price
" Cost Audits
" Comparisons of other Offers
Design Risks
Design risks will capture any risk that is introduced by Sikorsky's design process. The
major factor here is the maturity of the design. As designs get more and more mature, the
number of redesigns and the probability that the aircraft will not fly, as designed, will decrease.
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The level of Sikorsky (or other company) competence in building the design will directly affect
the ability of the project to stay on schedule. After the project is introduced, there will be
modifications and additions to the design. How many of these are anticipated, how many are
possible and how many are likely. How will these factors affect the cost and schedule of the
project? Another design risk addresses how well the design can deal with quality issues. This
will look at how tight the spec limits are for Sikorsky partners and how much above and beyond
that Sikorsky can accept when integrating the supplier's part with the rest of the aircraft. Will
quality problems set Sikorsky back by a large amount, or are there contingency plans in place?
The final design risk involves the transfer of Sikorsky's knowledge of the process to the new
partner. The main question is how can you transfer knowledge that may not have been written
down or communicated back to the design engineers. For example, on the manufacturing floor,
many changes will be made to the operations sheets to make fabrication more efficient. Many of
those changes only exist in the operations sheets on the floor. How do you ensure that you don't
lose those productivity improvements when the operation is moved? Even more basic a concern
is how to ensure that every detail is communicated correctly. Due to culture, geographic or
language barriers, the interpretation of some specs may be very different in other regions. The
risk drivers here are:
o Design Maturity
o Knowledge Transfer
= Language Barriers
* CAD data Compatibility
Operations Risks
How the partner operates can also contribute considerably to the risk profile of a supplier
relationship. The main operations factors identified as risks deal with the upstream supply chain,
quality standards at the company, risk in transfer of goods from the supplier to Sikorsky, and the
partner's manufacturing capabilities. These factors can be seen as the most direct influences on
the supplier's performance, as far as Sikorsky is concerned. For example, financial, design, and
business issues may significantly affect the overall company and in-turn effect the goods
delivered to Sikorsky, the operations risks, however, focus on the mechanisms by which the
supplier creates and provides the goods to Sikorsky.
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The upstream supply chain in the operations risks refers mainly to the materials that the
supplier purchases. The profile of where, how, and how much is purchased can say a lot about
the probability that a supplier will be able to deliver acceptable quality, on time, and within
budget. The important factors that were identified with respect to supplier materials purchasing is
whether they're able to purchase on the same terms as Sikorsky does, in cases of outsourcing, the
supplier's experience with international contracts, and how their credit standing is with respect to
their suppliers. Questions are focused on determining how healthy the company is with the
materials they are purchasing, how current they are on their accounts payable and finally whether
their material cost will be comparable to Sikorsky's or a competitors for creating the same
product.
Quality is important in any supplier relationship, but with aircraft the bar is raised even
higher as non-conforming product can mean the loss of life. Supplier quality is a result of their
efforts into defining quality standard and their ability to deliver reliably at the specified standard.
The first portion of the risk analysis focuses on past parts-per-million (PPM) defect rates with
this supplier. This data can be taken from previous business with Sikorsky (previous 5 years
max), or from business with other customers (via publicly available information). The next area
of focus is on how the supplier creates and enforces quality standards. By asking questions about
use of quality systems (i.e. Six Sigma7) and whether there is a dedicated quality group or person,
a measure of the supplier's commitment to quality can be obtained. Finally, the technological
sophistication of the supplier's manufacturing equipment is considered.
The supplier's manufacturing capabilities are analyzed from the aspects of lead time,
capacity, and previous delivery performance. As is generally the case, a supplier who is pushed
to their capacity and lead time limits will most likely show service level issues and late deliveries
will ensue. Tied to this is an analysis of previous delivery metrics for the supplier. The intent is
to determine whether the supplier has recurring delivery issues.
o Materials Purchasing
o Quality Standards
o Shipping Mechanisms
o Capabilities
7 Various Six Sigma references are available from Motorola at http://www.motorola.com/motorolauniversity.jsp
28
= Capacity
= Lead Time
= Previous Delivery Metrics
Business Risks
The previous risks have all been factors of the partner and Sikorsky itself. The final area,
business risks, more directly address concerns outside the scope of the companies involved.
These risks include geo-political and social risks, which hope to address whether political and
social issues in the partner country could affect the contract between the two companies.
Demand, Competitive and Cannibalization risks attempt to address whether marketing's view of
the project is accurate. Is the demand truly what is expected? How certain is the demand? The
last area is Licensing Risk. Licenses must be granted by the governments involved to allow the
manufacture of this aircraft abroad. Examples would be a Manufacturing License Agreement
(MLA) or Technical Assistance Agreement (TAA) per United States International Traffic in
Arms (ITAR) regulations. How difficult will it be to obtain and maintain these contracts?
o Geo-Political Risks
o Worker Risks
" Unions
= Strikes
o Demand Stability
o Uncategorized Ratings from Online Database
o Licensing
Each of these risks must be identified and quantified. The process of addressing these risk
factors will also open the door to increased information sharing between the supplier and
Sikorsky, and hopefully lead to greater supply chain visibility. "The visibility makes the supply
chain more transparent and can lead the way for performance improvements." (Lambert and
Pohlen, 2001). A small example of this increased visibility in the risks analyses above is for the
assessment of the supplier's source of supply. Some problems are, however, inevitable. For these
problems, having a diversified supplier portfolio may allow the company to overcome randomly
occurring problems in one (or more) suppliers. Local unrest in one country can be diversified
away by having secondary suppliers in a different country. A trade-off must be made though.
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Many modern customer-supplier relationships have focused on intimate relationships and
reducing number of suppliers. There needs to be careful analysis of the relationship and a
determination of where along the spectrum you would like to structure the supplier contract, as
shown in Figure 1. This is all part of the supplier decision process and the process of identifying
and measuring the risks listed above can help aid in the decision.
Supplier Scoring
The third phase of the framework creation, scoring, is the portion where the most insight
can be gained immediately. The other phases are intended to spur investigation of one's
suppliers, but they don't necessarily provide an instant response of what the supplier's risk
factors actually amount to. The scoring portion of the framework is where the user will see the
direct influence of project risk factors and how they may affect the outcome.
The process for determining the scoring, as mentioned previously, started with a large
amount of research and data gathering. Once suitable data had been gathered, a regression model
was created to determine the effect of the risk drivers on various supplier performance measures
(the risk effects). A portion of the initial data set had been set aside from the regression process
to be used for validation. For validation, the unused data was plugged into the framework and the
output was compared against the actual historic performance for those suppliers. Finally, upon
successful validation, the model coefficients were used as the weights for scoring in the final
version framework.
Data Gathering
For the first portion, a large sampling of data was collected on Sikorsky supplier
performance over the last 10 years. The suppliers to include in the study were selected based on
the ability to locate the data necessary to fill out the risk framework as if it were the date of
negotiations with the supplier (i.e. answer all questions as if it were 1997 and using only data
that were available at that time), as well as the ability to measure the performance of that supplier
since the evaluation date. In all, data for 50 companies over various time periods through the last
ten years were collected. Attention was paid specifically to the distribution of suppliers based on
geographic location, size, product type, and other factors to ensure the data accurately
represented a full range of the suppliers that Sikorsky uses. The parameters of 50 for the number
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of suppliers and ten years as the data horizon were selected purely based on what data was
available. Data farther back than 1997 was extremely difficult to locate, so therefore 1997 was
considered the farthest back that the study would go. The number of suppliers in the study was
intended to be greater than 50, but this was once again a function of what data was available and
what data was accessible within the timeframe of the project. Though it did not reach the
projected population size, the data set was complete enough to conduct a thorough study as
shown in later sections.
The data were collected from various sources, both internal and external to Sikorsky.
Much of the data was sourced from internal Sikorsky databases, which was the easiest source to
get bulk data from once access was granted. Paper and electronic documents were also used for
answering a number of questions. Much of this work relied on connecting with the correct people
and shuffling through large numbers of documents. The length of time required to gather data for
each supplier served as the main limiting factor for the data population size. There is no common
data retention standard at Sikorsky for some of the required documents, and though they'd be
readily available at the time of supplier evaluation they are difficult to locate in a retrospective
study. This is a possible data management issue in and of itself, which will be discussed further
in the chapter on future work (Chapter 3). The remainder of the data was collected from internet
sources. Multiple performance metrics had been targeted as the outputs of the model, but this list
had to be reduced to percentage lateness of deliveries and PPM defect rates. The reason, once
again, is that sufficient data did not exist in the population for other resultant performance
metrics.
Data analysis to refine scoring
With the data population created, a regression model was created using SAS Jmpln
software8. However, initial results revealed too few degrees of freedom to create a full model.
The root cause of this problem was the fact that the framework essentially has 25 risk questions
and the data population has 50 samples. Though the amount of data is technically sufficient,
some missing values for certain suppliers pushed the model fit below acceptable levels. The
number of questions was subsequently reduced using simple plots of performance vs. response
8 JMPIn is the reduced price student version. Information on fully licensed JMP software can be found at
http://www.jmp.com/software/
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for each risk driver question. A qualitative assessment was made of which factors looked to have
the largest effect (i.e. using comparative slope among questions). These plots are included as
Appendix 1 - Initial Effect Plots (The questions are numbered such that the first letter is the
main group Finance, Operations, Design, Business. The next number is the question number
within the main group and the letter after the number is which part of the question as some
questions are multi-part). From these plots, questions F-Ia, F-Ib, F-Ic, F-7, F-9, F- 11, D-3, B-1,
B-3, B-10, B-1 I were removed for Delivery lateness calculations and questions F-lb, F-ic, F-6a,
F-6c, F-8, F-13, F-14, 0-8, B-9, B-11, B-12 for PPM defect rate calculations. Removing those
questions for each response cut the number of factors for the regression to 14 for both Delivery
Lateness and PPM defect rates. Factors were cut if their response had possible redundancy with
other questions and if the effect (slope) of the factor in the Initial Effect Plot was insufficient to
merit including it. Another technique that was necessary to keep the sample size respectable was
to split the regression into two parts for each performance factor. The necessity to split the
regression was based on the "orthogonal" nature of some of the question responses; there were
three questions that had the possibility of being quite illustrative, but they were only available for
some of the oldest suppliers, due to the retention policies at Sikorsky. However, these older
suppliers had missing responses for some of the questions based on newer Sikorsky databases.
Since these questions were believed to be important and possibly illustrative, and they were only
three of 25 total questions, the decision was made to do a full model regression with these
questions removed so the data set for the regression would not be limited to the few suppliers
that had answers to these questions. These questions were then regressed by themselves with
respect to the performance factors, to evaluate their possible effect on the outputs. These terms
will be referred to as Cost-Price Analysis, or CPA, terms from now on. How these are tied back
into the model for framework scoring is described later.
Once the risk drivers with minimal significance (as judged by the effect plots) had been
manually removed, a mixed stepwise fit was performed for each performance factor with a
significance probability of .25 to enter and .20 to leave. Essentially, this technique starts with no
factor effects (risk drivers) in the model, and then adds them one by one if their individual
significance probability (based on the test statistic) is below the probability to enter. After each
factor is added, the error term for the model is recalculated and thus significance probabilities are
recalculated for each factor. As factors are added and significance probabilities change, they are
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monitored to make sure they do not drop below the probability to leave. If they do, they are
removed from the model. This technique is a mixture of forward selection and backward
elimination and is offered as a standard feature in SAS JmpIn. The concepts behind these
methods are available in statistics literature (Hocking, 1976). The data yielded a model for each
performance metric. These are analyzed below.
For each performance metric regression, the statistical printout is included in Appendix 2
- Model Regression Printouts. The results show the key factors that affected the percentage of
late deliveries in the gathered data are the financial stress score (which is an indicator from the
online database), labor rate trends, exchange rate trends (for international companies), and two
other ratings from the online supply chain database, order accuracy and business relations. This
model achieved a model significance probability (overall p-value) of .0025 and an R-Square of
.68. The actual vs. predicted and residual vs. predicted value plots for this model can be seen in
Figure 5.
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Figure 5 - Delivery Model Fit (in percentage of late deliveries)
In the case of PPM defect rates, the non-CPA factors that matter most are whether the
company supplies public financial reports, past quality performance, and a timeliness rating from
the online supply chain database. This model achieved an overall p-value of <.001 and an R-
Square of .83. The actual vs. predicted and residual vs. predicted value plots for this model can
be seen in Figure 6.
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Figure 6 - PPM Model Fit (non-CPA)
Finally, the only performance measure that appeared to have a statistical dependence on
the CPA terms was the resulting PPM defect rates. The most important CPA factor to PPM
performance was the percentage of product cost from labor (as opposed to materials). The model
achieved a p-value of .054 and an R-Square value of .39. Though a statistically significant fit for
this factor does exist, it has suspicious qualities. The model used a small number of data points
and the residual vs. predicted plot shows an apparent change in variance for different factor
levels. This portion of the model should be used sparingly and possibly only serve as a starting
point for future studies as its results will not be very accurate if used in the current state. The
actual vs. predicted and residual vs. predicted value plots is depicted as Figure 7.
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Figure 7 - PPM Model Fit (CPA terms)
A summary of these connections is contained in Figure 8 below. Dashed lines indicate a
factor kept after analyzing the plots in Appendix 1 - Initial Effect Plots. Solid lines indicate
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statistically significant effects as determined by the regression model. Only questions from the
framework for which data was obtained are included in the summary figure.
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Figure 8 - Risk Driver/Effect Connection Summary
Validation of scoring
To validate the models that were created from the data, the excluded samples were then
used to calculate predicted values with the models and these values were compared with the
actual performance, as collected. Five samples were excluded from the original data set of 50 to
compute the non-CPA models. The CPA based models posed an even tighter restriction on
validation factors as CPA data was only available for 15 of the 50 suppliers. Therefore the
number of validation factors was reduced to two. In both cases the decision was made to focus
the data on model creation, rather than validation. The plans had originally set out for a larger
number of validation factors, but the limits to data available forced the decision to reduce the
number of samples. A thorough explanation of the reasons that drove these decisions is included
in later sections.
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Predicted and actual plots for the validation points have been included below as Figure 9
and Figure 10. The plots show a correlation in slope for the models. As a predictive system, it
can be seen that the predicted values differ from the actual values. However, as a relative scoring
mechanism, slope is what matters most and will drive the scoring of the model.
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Scoring Discussion
The ultimate application of the regression models is to use model coefficients in the
framework as the scoring weights for the risk driver questions. To properly compute weights, the
full range of response to each risk driver was compared to the total range of effect on the
performance factor, as predicted by the model. For example, in the case of late delivery, given
the model coefficients in Table 3, the weight for the Financial Stress Score (F-5) question is
approximately 12%. The equation used to compute this weight is presented as Equation 1. To use
the equation, the coefficient for a question is the value in the "Estimate" column of Table 3, the
xmax is the maximum value that was inputted into the model for question x, and xmin is the
minimum value that was inputted into the model for question x. For most questions in the study,
36
answers were rated on a scale of 1-10, so the maximum value is 10 and the minimum is 1. An
exception to the "Range" equation exists for terms with the x{y-z} notation in model output (i.e.
F-6c and F-8 in Table 3). These terms are not continuous variables in the range of 1 to 10, they
instead use discrete values between 1 and 10. The xmax and xmin values to use in the "Range"
equation for these factors are 1 and -1 respectively.
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>t
Intercept 203.88011 41.47801 4.92 0.0002
F-5 -4.655456 1.401253 -3.32 0.0043
F-6c{5.5-3.25&1} -7.971682 2.871652 -2.78 0.0135
F-6c{3.25-1} -12.54417 4.562795 -2.75 0.0143
F-8{7.75&5.5-10} -6.717297 2.989993 -2.25 0.0391
0-8 -58.2893 13.84867 -4.21 0.0007
B-9 42.225925 13.62475 3.10 0.0069
Table 3 - Late Delivery Coefficients
Weight(F5 -Range(F5)
Range(F5) + Range(F6c) + Range(F8) + Range(08) + Range(B9)
Range(x) = coefficient * (xm - Xmin
Equation 1 - Model Weight Calculation
Using this approach, additional care must be taken regarding limiting of certain input
factors. Some factors, like those from the online supply chain database, display scores on a scale
from 1-10, but scores below 7 are extremely rare (in our data population for 0-8 and B-9, the
range for these drivers was 7.5-9.7). Therefore, the weights were calibrated using a range for 0-8
and B-9 range of 7-10. All values below 7, should they ever occur, will be clamped to a
minimum value of 7. Given the data population, this is a fair assumption, since the model was
created with no data for values below 7 and thus these serve as somewhat unknowns as far as the
model is concerned. However, as the model is updated periodically, these bounds should be
rechecked to ensure they still represent valid assumptions. In this same fashion, weights were
computed for each relevant risk driver and then added into the framework.
The framework creates a risk score for percentage late delivery and PPM separately.
These two scores are then displayed independently and averaged for the overall risk score.
In the analysis of the validation points of the model, the statement was made that the
relative slope of the predicted values as it compares with the relative slope of the actual values is
more important than the exact matching of the predicted values to the actual values. The
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intention of this statement is to stress that the tool is a relative evaluation tool rather than an
absolute evaluation tool; i.e. the goal of the framework is not to predict that company A will
have, for instance, 31% late deliveries and company B will have 65% late deliveries but rather to
provide guidance that company B will most likely have a higher percentage of late deliveries and
thus poses a higher level of risk. The fact has not been ignored that a tighter fit of predicted
versus actual values would enrich the comparison of the two companies, by providing a more
precise measure of how much higher company B's percentage of late deliveries will be. The
argument against this notion is that the higher accuracy model may create a false sense of trust in
the model and that supplier performance is still a pseudo-random process and a more precise
model may not improve the overall accuracy of the resulting analysis.
Finally, it is worth mentioning mental models that could support the results of the
models. For percentage of late deliveries, it was stated earlier that the important factors were
financial stress score, labor rate trends, exchange rate trends, and two more factors from the
online supply chain database. Factors that display an intuitive response are exchange rates and
the supply chain database metric for business relations. The exchange rate correlation shows that
when the U.S. dollar is performing very poorly with respect to the supplier's currency, late
deliveries rise. As the U.S. dollar gets closer to tracking the supplier's currency, late deliveries
drop. The intuitive explanation here could be related to the fact that many of Sikorsky's contracts
are paid in U.S. dollars. If the U.S. dollar is quickly devaluing with respect to the supplier's
currency, they may have less incentive to rush delivery and get paid in an extremely weak U.S.
dollar. However, as the U.S. dollar gets closer to tracking their currency, the effect of the
successful foreign economy and the close tracking of the U.S. dollar create the incentives to
deliver on time. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the model could be indicating that with a
quickly valuing U.S. dollar, deliveries seem to not be affected. The logic here can be related to a
valuable dollar and external problems with the business climate in the supplier's country causing
the supplier's currency to devalue vs. the U.S. dollar. These factors could offset, thus prompting
no overall effect on deliveries. Another intuitive connection with deliveries is the connection
between the business relations rating and deliveries. It would be easy to conclude that a supplier
that delivers on-time is more likely to have friendly dealings with their customer. In the PPM
regression model, most of the non-CPA factors can be intuitively explained as well. The factors
are previous quality metrics and the online supply chain database rating for delivery/timeliness.
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The mental model supporting the connection between poor quality in the past and resulting
quality performance in the future is that those with poor quality will rarely make large
exceptional quality improvements and thus deliver low quality products in subsequent contracts.
This mental model is backed up in the data. If a company appears to have had poor quality
performance before working with Sikorsky or in previous work with Sikorsky a reasonable
assumption is that these quality problems have not just gone away. In terms of the
delivery/timeliness rating, the data shows that a high rating for delivery/timeliness results in
higher quality problems; the assumption here being that a company focusing purely on getting
product out the door may be more likely to overlook quality issues.
In contrast to the factors presented in the previous paragraph, some of the connections
between risk drivers and performance are not entirely obvious. However, this is not to say a
possible cause can not be imagined. These factors point to possible areas of continued
exploration and even a new mental model of how these risk drivers behave. One example factor
is the connection between a supplier that provides annual reports and PPM defect rates. Original
analysis of these suppliers for this project focused on the data in the financial reports; financial
ratios were tested for correlation with resulting performance. However, no connection exists. The
connection, however, is purely between the act of providing reports and the defect rates. When
looking at companies that provide annual reports, they are generally the larger public companies.
When perceived from this angle, the connection can drawn that a larger customer, focused on
more diverse customers may have a larger quality problem than a small local company who's
largest contract is Sikorsky aircraft. In this context it is the opposite of the intuition that a large
sophisticated company should have better quality product than the basic local company.
However, the maturity of the company has not been considered. Just the fact that they are
publicly traded and provide annual reports does not mean they are a mature established
company. This example highlights the need for future studies to include further metrics, such as
company headcount, output, maturity, or customer base as new risk drivers. Another example
where the obvious mental model may be broken is that the regression shows no strong
connection between the online supply chain database score for Delivery/Timeliness and the
supplier's resulting delivery performance. One would expect these two values to be very closely
related. However, it may be simply illustrating that past delivery performance does not affect
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future delivery performance. This is the opposite of the link shown between historic quality
performance and resulting quality performance, where historic quality problems persist.
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Chapter 3: Conclusions and Future Implications
The scope of this project was focused on the creation and tuning of a framework for
supplier evaluation, but the effectiveness of this work as a supplier evaluation tool depends on
continued effort with the framework. Only with continued effort and diligence will the project
reach its full potential. Having discussed the motivation and actual creation of the framework,
this chapter opens with the next steps required for the project to be successful. The key areas of
future work are the implementation plan, data retention measures, and framework improvement
plan. The chapter then closes with the broad conclusions drawn from the previous sections of this
work.
Implementation Plan
First and foremost the framework needs to find its way into the hands of the buyers in the
Sikorsky Supply Management group. The buyers will be both the greatest users and drivers for
improvement. It will be crucial to introduce the program correctly and sell it as a tool to help the
buyers and not just another useless management requirement. One way to achieve user buy-in
with such a tool is to start with a pilot study. In this way, use of the framework can be focused on
a few buyers that may be more likely to adopt such a tool. Also, the pilot study may serve as a
way to gain further employee feedback on the framework, so the users can "make it their own".
Another key to getting the framework adopted as a lasting tool in the company is that there must
be a significant value proposition to adopting it. One possible value-proposition to help sell the
framework is to position it as an insurance mechanism in the event of poor supplier performance.
For example, in the current state buyers and managers each evaluate suppliers in their own way
and are generally accountable for ensuring suppliers relationships are successful. However, if a
standard tool is used by everyone, risky suppliers will be pointed out early, regardless of how
risk prone/averse a buyer is. Also, in the event that a supplier performs poorly despite a good
rating from the framework, the buyer has some leverage and can prove their due diligence by
having used the framework; poor supplier performance can be seen as the effect of an anomaly
rather than poor preparation by the buyer. Finally, the message has to be relayed that the results
of the tool are important to management. If the risk scores are ignored or disregarded in many
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cases, the users will stop using the tool as it will be perceived as unimportant. This will take
commitment from both parties involved.
Data Retention Measures
As mentioned earlier, a major hurdle to the success of this initiative is the differing data
retention policies used throughout the company. The first change that needs to occur is a
commitment within management to standardize data collection at Sikorsky. This can be achieved
through mandates of common retention systems and policies. As with most corporate change
initiatives, it is important that there is buy-in from all parties involved and that the change is not
forced from above. However, if all users understand the goals and benefits of better retention
policies, a change can truly be made.
As the user base of the framework grows, a secondary benefit is that it will formalize the
collection of common data throughout the group. In effect, the framework will serve as a method
for aggregating pertinent data on a supplier into a single database that can be retained on its own
schedule, regardless of what the other parts of the company decide. This can serve as a robust
data source for refinements of the model as well as by other parts of the company for information
about Sikorsky's supply base. An audit of the questions within the framework should be
conducted and the data necessary to answer each question should be included in any new data
retention system.
Another aspect of the data retention will be the addition of new questions and data
sources to the analysis over time. As users start to see new risk factors emerge in supplier
relationships, these factors can be added to the framework and tracked. When the model is
updated next, the newly tracked data can be integrated into a subsequent model regressions
rather than having to dig up data in retrospect that may not be available anymore, which was a
recurring problem in this study.
Refinement Plan
The natural next step, once the framework is widely used and more data is collected, is
that the scoring will be refined over time. As discussed earlier, the amount of available data
limited the amount of analysis possible in this study. More formalized data collection through the
supply management department will allow regular updates of the model scoring. These updates
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will show the effects of new supplier trends as well as refine the effects from previous model
studies, like this one.
On a set schedule, a select group of managers and buyers will need to gather and review
the model. This review will focus first on the questions within the questionnaire. Over time,
some questions may be proven useless to the analysis, while new questions may be added to
contribute to ease of use or effectiveness of the data collected. After the review of the questions,
the scoring weights should be updated based on the newly collected data. Off-the-shelf statistics
tools can be used to allow the model to follow new supplier trends as new data is collected.
There are also opportunities to improve the way the framework develops a risk score.
Beyond simply displaying a single value for the risk score, the model should also display a
measure of the possible range or variance in risk expected. Figure 7 is an example where
variance changes significantly based on the model inputs. Though the initial decision was made
to use the mean values for the risk score, for simplicity, future refinements should capture the
effect of the framework questions on the variance of the expected performance.
Conclusions
The project started with an idea about the inadequacy of current supplier evaluation
methods in use at Sikorsky and has ended with a risk evaluation framework and a plan for the
future. The Risk Evaluation Framework encapsulates the knowledge gathered from multiple
supply chain professionals, both at Sikorsky and external to the company, as well as data and
metrics from diverse parts of Sikorsky and external publicly available data. This data and
knowledge has been used to set the format of the framework, tune the questions within the
framework and draw connections between various risk factors and ultimate supplier
performance. In addition to giving the user "answers" about a supplier, the framework's main
purpose is to get the user to ask questions they may not have asked otherwise, which is where the
true learning will take place. As mentioned, the Framework will have to be updated and refined
to provide valid results over time; it's not the output of the model that provides the largest value,
however, it is the process that will hopefully drive the Supply Chain professionals at Sikorsky to
ask the right questions and make a focused deep dive into analyzing suppliers. This is not to say
that the scoring mechanism is not adding value. The learning also continues in providing data
driven scoring for a supplier; not due to getting a single number result (which does have its uses),
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but more importantly in getting the user to think about the relationships and why a risk driver
may cause performance to suffer in a supplier. It also serves as a proof of concept that one can
see a correlation between seemingly unrelated aspects of a supplier and resulting performance.
These correlations can then be used to enhance the supplier relationship.
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Chapter 4: Organizational Analysis
To assess the ability of the project to be effective and also develop a strategy for
completing the project in a timely fashion, a three lens analysis was used. To address the
project's overall effectiveness each lens was used to determine what the employees at Sikorsky
really respond to, and in turn guided the ways in which the project was crafted. Taking into
account what all three lenses revealed about the project's implications, it allowed the project to
be formulated so it is helpful to the users rather than a hindrance. For the latter issue of being
able to gather the data needed, the lenses were used as a guide on whom to approach within the
company and how to approach them to convey that the data will ultimately help the company.
The analysis starts with the strategic design lens, moves on to the political lens, and then finishes
with the cultural lens.
Strategic Design Lens
The strategic design lens focuses on the structures of the groups and policies within the
company and the ways in which those structures and policies are linked. In the example of
international procurement, it is an offshoot of the overall supply management group, tasked with
focusing on international suppliers. The linkages between the overall supply management group
and the international group are both in proximity, as both groups are located next to each other,
but also through processes. Both groups are tasked with using the same systems and procedures.
There is even some overlap between the members of the two groups on day-to-day work. A
hierarchy is set up such that the supply management groups as well as a strategic sourcing group
all report to the same person to facilitate coordination and consolidation of strategic sourcing
resources.
The international procurement group was created to initiate and manage all international
supplier contracts for Sikorsky. The group handles relationships and researches regions for
suitable international suppliers that offer quality parts at as low a rate as possible. In addition this
group is required to find international suppliers to satisfy offset requirements placed on certain
projects. The macro challenge that the project addresses is the need to have standardized
measures of supplier risk, to avoid making costly mistakes when evaluating new suppliers. This
framework allows the user to be nimble in signing on new suppliers, while still monitoring the
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risks involved. It will provide a more concrete screening mechanism than anything in use today.
The project addresses the day to day needs of the group and falls squarely within the strategic
tasks of international procurement. A more suitable resting place is probably in strategic
sourcing, but as a tool created among the people using it, it may catch on more quickly in the
group that created it. However, the international procurement group is small and for the project
to have a larger effect, as hoped, the effect of the framework on the larger supply management
organization must be mapped out as well.
Overall a micro challenge within Supply Management will exist in transferring the
framework beyond international procurement. Though the groups have been set up to
strategically work together, many of the linkages between international procurement and the rest
of Supply Management are not there on a day to day basis. Many of the other groups within
Supply Management have standard work practices and hierarchy set up specifically to allow
information sharing and easy access. However, the manager of international procurement has his
own streamlined processes within the system and sometimes avoids the standard measures. To
overcome the lacking linkages between groups, hierarchical design of the larger group can be
used to sell the project to the VP in charge of the group and have it sent to the surrounding
groups from above.
When it comes time to implement, one must be aware of both the structural mechanisms
used in both the international procurement group and the remaining supply management groups.
As long as constructs and methods that are acceptable to both are used, initiatives will avoid
getting road blocked by the structure. However, Sikorsky is a very hierarchical company, so
support from the top is also a useful mechanism for getting ideas rolled out within the groups.
Political Lens
The political lens is focused on the power within Sikorsky and how that power is used to
accomplish tasks within the company. Though the hierarchical design described above is a large
source of power within the company, personal relationships can wield just as much power. With
Sikorsky's large percentage of senior workers, much gets done through personal contact and
purely having contacts in other departments. Many employees have worked in various parts of
the company, over the years, and have formed relationships in all of those departments.
Anecdotal evidence has shown that when attempting to retrieve data or get help within a group,
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just approaching the right person and asking may not get the job done. As many of the
employees are extremely busy, they must pick and choose what gets addressed first; a stranger
approaching with a request will not be on top of the list. However, when approached by a friend
or a personal contact, most people will easily make time to help out. For those not as senior in
the company it is crucial to develop contacts with those more senior and tap into those networks
for help. Friendship and rank both yield power in the company and tapping into either is
necessary to survive.
In the context of this project, it was important to ally with those in the company that have
important contacts and are willing to help. Beyond that, it is important to properly convey the
goals of work and who the work is being done for. In many cases, simply mentioning that the
work is being done for the benefit of a friend can help open doors that would otherwise be shut.
These power systems create two main paths for influencing: use the hierarchy and have help
requested from above, or use personal contacts to navigate the company.
Cultural Lens
To discuss the cultural lens, it will be effective to start with the three structural beams for
leverage at Sikorsky, as described in "True Change" (Klein, 2006). Sikorsky appears to favor
one side of each beam fairly heavily. On the legitimacy beam, Sikorsky favors the "Experience
Based" side over "Technocratic". In the basis for relationships, the hierarchical side is favored
heavily, but as mentioned in the last section, examples of lateral relationships in Sikorsky do
exist and are quite strong. It is all a matter of a person's years experience at Sikorsky and the
personal relationships they've developed. Finally, on the basis for support, Sikorsky appears to
be largely authoritarian. Each of these will be discussed in further detail.
It's very apparent from the first day of working how much Sikorsky values age and
seniority. The first example is when you park your car. At a facility employing 9000+, at least
half of the parking spots (and all of the closest ones) are reserved for those with higher pay
grades and larger numbers of years with the company. Another example can be seen in the large
number of Sikorsky retirees that are brought back as contractors. Even the badge you wear at
Sikorsky bears special symbols for people that have many years of experience. The vast majority
of management and persons in positions of power at Sikorsky that I have met have many years of
experience. There doesn't appear to be a "fast track", for young, savvy recruits; like the military,
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you must earn your stripes before promotion. Though recent changes in these policies due to new
management can be seen, Sikorsky still heavily favors those who are older and have more
experience. Though these examples don't necessarily prove that Sikorsky does not have
technocratic culture, they attempt to portray some of the symbols that Sikorsky uses to reward
people for their age and number of years with the company.
As mentioned for relationships, Sikorsky leans toward a hierarchical culture. As is the
case in the international procurement group, your influence only extends as far as the group you
belong to. When the time comes to spread the risk management framework outside of the
international procurement group, hierarchical levers will have to be pulled. To do this, a person
higher up in the hierarchy must support the work and drive the implementation from above. An
example of having to use the hierarchical lever occurred with an informal survey I distributed for
the project. I E-mailed a superior for some ideas on people that may help in the survey. Rather
than just giving me names and telling me the people that would help, he sent me a response to
my request with the names of the people that would help and carbon copied each of the people
on the message. In this way, he was telling them to help me. If this request had not come directly
from him, I doubt I would have gotten this help. There have also been examples, however, of the
effect of lateral connections within the company. I was lucky enough to end up in the same group
as an MIT SDM alumnus. This person served as an outsider-insider (Klein, 2004) and helped me
make the connections needed to deliver my ideas to key people. Due to his many years of
experience, he has contacts in almost every corner of the building, yet he attended MIT recently,
so he is able to understand my position. This person has allowed me to bypass the hierarchy in
some ways and learn from people that I may have not met. In the long run though, I feel that
many of these contacts will discuss work and offer informal advice, but when the time comes
that I ask for them to commit some time to helping my project, I may need a push from above
rather than a friendly relationship to really get them to take time out of their schedules.
Finally, on the basis for support Sikorsky is very authoritarian. Much of this is built into
the culture, but I feel another cause is a fire-fighting mentality that embodies purchasing at
Sikorsky. The group is exceptionally good at putting out these fires and thus focuses on that type
of work. Many people are so busy that they can not help out unless they are authorized by a
person of authority. This will pose a challenge, as discussed, when attempting to roll out the
framework to other people in Supply Management. However, once the tool is in their hands,
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there may be inroads to bypass the authoritarian tendencies to improve the tool and make their
job easier. It appears that for first contact with a topic, it must have management backing, but for
the workers to improve something and make it their own, they appear to be more receptive to
helping.
Three Lens Conclusion
Sikorsky is a large company with very distinct norms. To be effective within the
company it is important to learn and follow the company norms as many of employees operate
on close personal relationships. After the three lens analysis it can be seen that the most
dominant lenses of the analysis are the political and cultural lenses. These two lenses appear to
be very closely tied and the reason for this is the military-like culture at Sikorsky. Many of the
past and current employees at Sikorsky have backgrounds in the military and Sikorsky's largest
sales are military products. An anecdotal example of this was on a tour though the plant one day.
While walking through the plant a friend asked me if I'd been into the hangar. I responded by
asking, "The commercial hangar?" To that, my friend responded "No, thektiffitary hangar
Another long-time Sikorsky employee added "The REAL hangar". The focus on and history in
the military has guided management and structural decisions within Sikorsky. It appears that the
Strategic Design of policies here was chosen to support the strong culture. The political power
feeds directly off of the cultural aspects as well. Many levels of authoritarian hierarchy are used
to create an environment and power system that is comfortable to many here, an environment
like the military.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 - Initial Effect Plots
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Appendix 2 - Model Regression Printouts
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